Pacemakers and end-of-life decisions by McQuoid-Mason, David
August 2005, Vol. 95, No. 8  SAMJ
SAMJ FORUM
566
May the pacemaker of a patient who is terminally ill be turned
down at the request of the person concerned or in terms of an
advanced directive (a ‘living will’), or does such an act
constitute ‘active’ euthanasia?1
Refusal of treatment
It is accepted in South African law that patients have the right
to refuse medical treatment even if it may cause them to die, if
they have the legal capacity to make such a decision.2 In
English law the principle ‘extends to situations where the
person, in anticipation of his … entering into a condition such
as PVS [persistent vegetative state], gives clear instructions that
in such event he is not to be given medical treatment …
designed to keep him alive’.3 It is submitted that similar
principles apply in our law where patients have made a ‘living
will’ that reflects their current wishes. It is no different from
patients issuing an advance directive that they do not wish to
undergo a blood transfusion should the need arise even if it
may result in death.
‘Living wills’
‘Living wills’ are advance directives which state that if a person
suffers from an incurable disease or injury that cannot be
successfully treated, artificial life-sustaining treatment should
be withheld or withdrawn and the patient left to die naturally.4
‘Living wills’ have not yet been recognised by South African
courts or legislation and are still being considered by the
government.5
0Even though there is no statutory recognition of living wills
in South Africa, it is submitted that they should be regarded as
legally binding, provided that they were made when the
patient was mentally competent, and doctors are satisfied that
they reflect the patient’s current wishes.
Are pacemakers an ‘artificial means’ of
keeping people alive?
It has been suggested that pacemakers are fitted to improve the
quality of life rather than as life-support mechanisms,2 and this
may be true while the patient is in good health. Where,
however, patients suffer from serious illnesses or injuries that
would otherwise result in their death but for the presence of
the pacemaker, the latter becomes an ‘artificial means’ of
support that delays the dying process.
The courts have held that the withdrawal of treatment in
circumstances where the patient’s condition is terminal and the
prognosis is hopeless does not amount to a new intervening act
between the underlying cause of death and the withdrawal of
treatment.6 It is submitted that the same principle applies to
the turning down of a pacemaker which results in the
underlying illness or injury causing the death of the patient.6
Pacemakers and brain-dead patients 
The new National Health Act now defines ‘death’ as ‘brain
death’.7 In the unlikely event that a brainstem-dead person’s
pacemaker continues to function, he or she would be legally
regarded as dead. Therefore turning down the pacemaker
would have no effect on the person’s status as a deceased
person – a person who is already dead cannot be killed by
turning down a pacemaker. 
Pacemakers and PVS patients 
PVS patients have ‘a functioning brainstem [but] a total loss of
cerebral cortical functioning’.8 Where such patients face a
hopeless prognosis and the pacemaker is artificially prolonging
the dying process (and the patient has not made a ‘living will’),
the doctor should consult with the patient’s relatives in
accordance with the Declaration of Venice9 and the Mental
Health Act.10 In cases where a ‘living will’ has been made the
wishes of the patient should be respected.  In both situations
the resultant death of the patient is regarded as due to the
underlying illness or injury rather than the turning down of the
pacemaker and legally there is no causal link between the
reduction of pacemaker activity and the death of the patient.6
Pacemakers and comatose non-PVS
patients 
Patients in comas differ from PVS patients in that the latter are
incapable of emerging from a coma, while the former may
recover if the damage to the brain is not permanent or
insufficient to prevent recovery.11
Where it is not known whether or not a non-PVS patient may
emerge from a coma in a mentally competent state, the
patient’s pacemaker may not be turned down to hasten death.
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There are no good statistics available with regard to the
prevalence, treatment patterns and results of treatment of
valvular heart disease in South Africa. However, most
practitioners with experience in the area agree that valvular
heart disease remains common and is not managed well. The
reasons why patients with valvular heart disease are not
recognised and treated appropriately are complex.  Blame can
be apportioned to many aspects of the system of medical care
available to such patients, and as much as I am a part of that
system I must acknowledge a degree of responsibility for any
deficiencies. It is worth examining and discussing the previous
and current situation so that we can devise strategies to
improve the care we provide in the future.
Before the mid-1980s South African clinician scientists made
significant contributions to knowledge in the area of valvular
heart disease.  The mitral valve prolapse syndrome and
features of sub-mitral aneurysm were first described in South
Africa. Large observational studies described management of
patients with a variety of manifestations of valvular heart
disease, which were mainly rheumatic in aetiology.  Reports of
the beneficial effects of successful mitral valve repair or
valvotomy, valve replacement surgery in acute rheumatic
The turning down of a pacemaker under such circumstances
may amount to murder – unless it can be shown that the
prognosis was hopeless and that the patient’s death resulted
from the injury or illness that originally caused the coma.8 In
cases where comatose patients become PVS the principles
regarding PVS patients and pacemakers will apply.
Turning down a pacemaker to hasten
death — ‘active’ or ‘passive’
euthanasia?
In law there is a distinction between a positive action that
causes death (e.g. giving a patient a lethal injection) which
amounts to murder,12 and the stopping of an action that allows
death (e.g. switching off a ventilator) which may not amount to
unlawful homicide, if done in reasonable circumstances.11
Turning down a pacemaker to enable a patient with a hopeless
prognosis to die naturally from the underlying cause is similar
to switching off a ventilator under the same conditions. Both
acts can be regarded as ‘passive’ rather than ‘active’ euthanasia
because the prognosis is hopeless and the patient dies from the
underlying cause.  
Advising pacemaker patients about
‘living wills’
Patients fitted with pacemakers should be told of the possible
consequences should they become incapacitated as a result of a
major illness or injury, particularly where the pacemaker may
delay the dying process. The possible choices for end-of-life
decisions, including the advisability of making a ‘living will’,
should be discussed.  Such discussions should form part of the
informed consent procedure before implantation of the
pacemaker. This is because patients must also be told the
consequences of any procedure to which they consent. 
It is advisable, but not essential, that ‘living wills’ should
include specific reference to pacemakers in the context of
‘artificial’ means or support. The Living Will Society of South
Africa (SAVES) now includes a pacemaker clause in its living
wills.
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